From Policy Implementation

Paper Pushing

Devils (and angels) in the details, Part 4

Nobody wants to talk about this part

In early January the California Water Board published its long-anticipated draft proposal for a statewide low-income water bill assistance program. In the past few posts, I’ve summarized the path-breaking proposal, discussed its potentially perverse incentives for ratemaking, and pondered its implications for small system consolidation. In this post, I take up that crucial but oft-overlooked dimension of public policy: administration.

Administering statewide water bill assistance

The draft proposal acknowledges that administering a brand new social welfare transfer program will be costly and complicated. The low-income water rate assistance program will need to be advertised, applications processed, incomes and personal data verified, customers enrolled, and so on. Then the benefits themselves would need to be distributed in some way. Participants will need to renew their eligibility periodically, which will require re-verification. Audit procedures will be needed to guard against fraud and abuse, and appeals processes established to provide recourse to those wrongfully denied benefits.

The draft proposal punts on who exactly would do all that administrative work.

Benefit distribution

Rather than arguing for a specific administrative arrangement, it lays out four potential approaches to benefit disbursement:

  1. Water bill credits
  2. Energy bill credits
  3. EBT (Electronic Benefits Transfer) cards
  4. Tax credits

The first option might seem most obvious, but the draft report correctly observes that many benefit-eligible households may not receive water bills directly, because they live in multifamily or rental housing and so pay for water service through their rent. Options #2-4 have the potential to reach more households. Options #3 and #4 most closely approximate the received wisdom of welfare research, which suggests that benefits work best when they are received directly by their beneficiaries.

What about everything else?

But there’s much more to a low-income assistance program than handing out benefits. Conspicuously absent from the draft report is discussion of the many other aspects of administering a new assistance program. Here are some options.

Asking for help ain’t easy. Giving it ain’t, either.

Utility administration. Water systems could administer the program on behalf of the state (several California investor-owned utilities already run assistance programs, for example). Utility organizations are, by and large, unaccustomed to administering social welfare programs. Recently I’ve had the opportunity to study a handful of water utilities that administer low-income assistance programs. I found that, when water utilities get into the low-income assistance game, utility staff become de facto social workers. Water customers who apply for assistance often struggle with multiple health, financial, legal, and perhaps cultural problems. It is impossible not to make a human connection in such cases. Laudably, the utility folks I’ve met who administer water assistance programs work hard to do so humanely and responsibly. But welfare administration is, at best, an uneasy fit for many utility organizations. Moreover, the burden of administering an assistance program would be especially onerous for the very small systems that already suffer disproportionately from high prices and poor water quality.

State administration. The California Water Board (or some new agency) could create a new organization to administer the program. This sort of centralized administration could provide economies of scale and help ensure uniformity and fairness across the state. On the other hand, state administration would involve significant new investments in staffing and other administrative infrastructure, all of which would be subject to the vagaries of state politics.

Nonprofit administration. Water bill assistance could be administered through community-based nonprofit community service organizations like the Salvation Army or St Vincent DePaul Society. In addition to providing direct charitable aid, such organizations often are conduits for government assistance programs like LIHEAP. Many of these nonprofit organizations employ sizable, multilingual staffs that include social workers, nutritionists, lawyers, and other professionals who help low-income individuals and families navigate the often confusing and sometimes humiliating process of applying for benefits. These organizations’ expertise, flexibility, and familiarity with target populations offer perhaps the most promising avenue for administration.

The recipient’s administrative burden

Also missing from the California Water Board’s draft proposal—and most of the broader discussion of low-income water bill assistance—is consideration of the administrative burdens that water customers would have to bear in order to receive benefits. Learning about the assistance program, applying, demonstrating eligibility, ensuring receipt, and reapplying are time-consuming and sometimes humiliating processes. These costs may be especially significant for people with low literacy or limited English proficiency. Potentially eligible people may forego benefits if the application process is too burdensome, if they perceive a social stigma associated with public assistance, or if they do not trust government.

Taken together, administrative costs—to the state, to utilities, and to low-income households—are a big part of why I’ve argued that rate structures, not assistance programs, offer the most promising path to water affordability. Low fixed rates and low prices for essential water use make water affordable for everyone. Unlike assistance programs, affordability through rate design doesn’t create new administrative costs, and doesn’t make customers endure intrusive and burdensome application processes. As policymakers grapple with water affordability in California and beyond, they should consider ways to help encourage utilities to price water more affordably alongside bill assistance efforts.

 

Water Cops

Many California communities restricted outdoor irrigation during the recent drought. Did enforcement matter?

Bad water boys, watchya gonna do when they come for you?

Faced with water scarcity, communities sometimes restrict residential outdoor water use, such as car washing and especially lawn/garden irrigation. These water restrictions are effective in driving water conservation, and many California communities adopted them during that state’s recent drought (I’ve blogged about them before). The severity of those restrictions varied considerably, with some utilities allowing unlimited irrigation, some allowing irrigation just one or two days per week, and a few banning outdoor irrigation altogether.

Enforcement of those restrictions was  up to individual utilities, and enforcement actions varied considerably. Youlang Zhang and I have been analyzing those enforcement actions and how they correlated with conservation outcomes; we’ll present our first results at the APSA Conference in Boston next week. How did California utilities enforce water restrictions? Did enforcement actions affect water consumption?

Avenues of enforcement

In July 2014 the SWRCB authorized local water utilities to impose fines of up to $500 a day for violating water restrictions and invited citizens to report violations of water use restrictions through online portals and telephone hotlines. After receiving complaints or observing violations, utilities proceeded with a series of escalating enforcement steps. The first is a follow-up action, an informal intervention that typically involves sharing information with the violator with a goal of compliance through education. The second step is a formal warning, where the utility informs the violator of regulations and potential penalties. The final step is a formal penalty and fine.

A different logic underlies each of these enforcement actions Follow-up actions convey information about public policies and community values, with the expectation that greater awareness will motivate conservation. Warnings threaten violators with punishment, and so raise the prospective cost of profligacy. Penalties punish past action in hope of deterring future behavior. Over the course of the drought local utilities issued hundreds of thousands of warnings and levied tens of thousands of penalties for violating water regulations.

Enforcement effects

We analyzed monthly data from California over the 32-month drought emergency period, looking for relationships between utilities’ enforcement actions and total conservation by those utilities. Basically we were asking: does past enforcement predict present conservation?

Initial results are fascinating. Informal follow-up actions and penalties had no statistically discernible relationship with conservation. Only warnings appear to be correlated with conservation. Here are the effects, plotted graphically:

Marginal effects of enforcement action on conservation

In substantive terms, these results indicate that 100 formal warnings results in about 0.1% greater conservation. Though these figures are small in percentage terms, they represent potentially large volumes of water. An average of 500 more warnings each month during the observation period would have reduced the state’s total water consumption by 29 billion gallons—enough to supply the City of San Francisco for 15 months.

So are penalties pointless?

Does that mean that penalties don’t work? Not necessarily. It’s likely that the positive effects of warnings depend on the threat of penalties. Also, a $500 penalty might be an insufficient incentive for conservation in utilities where penalties were imposed. If you’re a rich celebrity, you might not care about a $500 fine enough to stop wasting water. Without detailed data on individual violations (which we don’t have), it’s hard to say.

In any event, the effects of all enforcement actions were apparently short-lived. Enforcement actions were most influential early in the drought emergency, when climatic conditions were most severe. As the drought weakened, the influence of enforcement also declined. The effects of all three types of enforcement actions appear to be negligible in the long run.

Lessons for conservation

We need to do more work to make sure we have the analysis right and to tease out all of the temporal effects, but our findings to date suggest three preliminary takeaways:

  1. Formal warnings are most effective in driving overall conservation; and
  2. Warnings can lead to immediate conservation during an emergency; but
  3. Enforcement effects decline in the long run, and so probably don’t help promote conservation as a “way of life.”

 

Political Decoupling

A California Surprise, Part 2

More drought porn (this is used to be Folsom Lake)

How private implementation separates public policies from their political costs.

Warning: this post contains hardcore wonkery.

In 2015 the California State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) ordered drinking water utilities to reduce water usage by 25% statewide. As my last post described, something surprising happened: compared with local governments, the state’s private, investor-owned utilities imposed stricter water use regulations, were nearly twice as likely to comply with the state mandate, and conserved significantly more water overall.

Though counterintuitive, this difference in public and private sector water conservation follows rationally from the political institutions that govern water in America generally and California specifically. The keys to this conundrum are money and politics.

Financial risks of conservation

American water utilities operate on a fee-for-service basis; typically, customers pay a fixed monthly charge, plus a charge for each unit of water. Faced with resource scarcity or some other environmental problem, it may make sense to curb water consumption—say, in response to a drought. But reduced consumption reduces revenue. For utilities that rely on rate revenue to fund their operations (and, in the case, of private utilities, to pay their shareholders), conservation can be environmentally good but financially bad.

The financial risks of conservation are especially severe for utilities due to their very high fixed costs. As I’ve observed before, whether a utility delivers one gallon or ten million gallons, the costs of constructing, maintaining, and operating reservoirs, treatment plants, and distribution pipes are the same. A drop in water sales doesn’t bring a matching drop in costs to the utility, so reduced consumption threatens financial sustainability (for government utilities) and profitability (for investor-owned utilities).

Utilities are natural monopolies, and so could charge customers exorbitant prices if they were allowed to set prices any way they like. For that reason, utilities are subject to government price regulation. But the institutions that govern private and public utilities are different, and present them with very different incentives to comply with state conservation rules.

Price regulation & decoupling

Let’s start with private utilities.

Governments regulate private utility pricing through state Public Utilities Commissions (PUCs); in California the PUC is composed of five appointed commissioners. The PUC process is technocratic and legalistic, usually drawing scant media attention. PUC price regulation proceeds under the cost of service principle: companies are limited to recovering the actual cost of providing service, plus a legally-sanctioned rate of return.

It only looks Soviet

Decades ago, the conflict between conservation and profitability for private utilities led environmentalists to develop rate decoupling: the separation of a firm’s revenues from the volume of product it sells. If conservation causes revenue shortfalls, decoupling provides for automatic rate increases to make up the loss. In that way, decoupling shifts the financial risks of conservation from utilities’ investors to their customers, eliminating the incentive for utilities to sell more and more energy, water, or whatever. Decoupling can work in situations where private utilities operate under PUC regulation, and has generally been successful in stimulating conservation in the energy sector. Today about half of US states use rate decoupling for electrical utilities.

In 2008, California became one of just two states (the other is New York) to adopt decoupling for water utilities when it introduced the Water Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (WRAM). Private utilities take advantage of this provision when conservation causes a loss of sales revenue: financial losses associated with reduced sales volumes are recovered in future rate increases through WRAM. PUC records show that by Spring 2018, at least 39 of the 62 investor-owned utilities subject to California’s conservation mandate had invoked WRAM and raised rates following the drought. Decoupling irritates customers, who understandably grumble about paying more for water they didn’t use—the paradox of conservation. But those grumbles are largely impotent, as the PUC’s technocratic process allows WRAM under state law.

Water rate politics & the conservation paradox

And then there are local governments.

Governments (including counties, municipalities, and special districts) that own drinking water utilities are essentially self-regulated with respect to pricing; their rates are set by city councils and district boards. Public water rates are thus subject to the political calculations of local elected officials. Water customers are also voters who prefer lower rates, and so raising rates can have bad electoral consequences for politicians. Unlike the technocratic PUC process, rate-setting for government utilities can be a contentious affair. In California the political risks are especially pronounced, since public water rates are subject to Proposition 218.

California local government utilities can raise rates when conservation measures cause revenue shortfalls; they need not seek permission from the PUC. But raising rates is politically risky for local officials. Whatever their attitudes toward sustainability, citizen-customers of government utilities are just as irritated as customers of private utilities when they use less but pay more. Government managers and elected officials are wary of angering their voting water customers if revenue losses force rate increases.

Attendance at the Redlands city council meeting on water rates was robust. Photo: informedredlands.com

Consider the politics of water conservation in the City of Redlands. California’s 2015-2016 emergency rules assigned the city a 33% conservation standard. The city responded with a series of conservation measures, but met its conservation standard in just two out of twelve months and achieved only 11.3% conservation overall. Still, reduced water sales caused a city revenue loss of about $2 million. When utility staff recommended a 19% rate increase to cover the shortfall, more than 3,000 citizens filed protests against the increase in advance of a raucous, five-hour City Council meeting on the subject. Drought-related rate increases prompted similar protests and/or legal challenges in Alameda County Water District, East Bay MUD, Hillsborough, Los Angeles, Pleasanton, and Yorba Linda.

Political decoupling

When combined with rate decoupling, private water provision shifts to private firms the political risk that discourages conservation by governments. The unelected PUC absorbs those political risks instead. In this way, investor-owned water utilities provided a kind of political decoupling during California’s drought: private implementation of conservation rules separated a controversial environmental policy from its political costs, and helped make private firms more effective conduits of environmental policy than were government agencies. Youlang ZhangDavid Switzer, and I develop the idea of political decoupling and its broader implications in a forthcoming article.

Of course, decoupling conservation from its political costs does not eliminate those costs so much as place them beyond the reach of ordinary citizens. That might make for effective drought response, but it weakens democratic local governance.

 

A California Surprise, Part 3 will discuss what happened after the SWRCB dropped the conservation mandate.